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FROM INNOVATION TO ABUSE: DOES THE
INTERNET STILL NEED SECTION 230 IMMUNITY?
Benjamin Volpe+
“The [i]nternet is the first thing that humanity has built that humanity
doesn’t understand, the largest experiment in anarchy that we have
ever had.”
– Eric E. Schmidt, Board of Directors, Alphabet Inc.1
I. INTRODUCTION

In American jurisprudence, online entities such as websites and social media
platforms have broad immunity to turn a blind eye to illegal, harmful, and
tortious activity that occurs via their online services, at the expense of the
unwary consumer.2 When a 13-year-old girl meets a sexual predator online,
leading to a sexual assault, the website that facilitated interactions leading to the
assault enjoys immunity from tort liability.3 Twitter is immune from liability
for allowing terrorist groups to use its platform to spread extremist propaganda,
raise funds, attract recruits, and ultimately carry out attacks. 4 And notoriously,
multiple children have been trafficked in the sex trade through the use of online
classified websites, but after finding their freedom, were unable to hold the

J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law, 2019; M.P.S., The George
Washington University, College of Professional Studies, 2009; B.A., Cedarville University, 2007.
I would like to thank Professor Chris Savage for his expert guidance and feedback during the
process of writing this Comment.
1. Graham Singer, In Hindsight...Infamous Tech Industry Predictions and Quotations,
TECHSPOT (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.techspot.com/article/754-tech-predictions-and-quotes/
(quoting Eric E. Schmidt, ex-Google CEO, Alphabet Board of Directors).
2. See Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Rebooting Cybertort Law, 80 WASH. L.
REV. 335, 370 (2005). “Websites can facilitate defamation, pornography, and wholesale invasions
of privacy without the risk of tort liability.” Id. at 373.
3. In Doe v. Myspace, the child’s parent sued Myspace, an internet social networking
website, for negligence and strict product liability after the child’s assault, asserting that Myspace
should have had safety measures in place to protect children against predators. See Doe v. Myspace,
629 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2009). Myspace prevailed on a motion to dismiss after the court
found it was not an information content provider—thus immune under § 230 of the
Communications Decency Act. See id. at 664. But see Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846
(9th Cir. 2016) (holding the Communications Decency Act did not immunize a modeling website
from tort liability when rapists utilized the website to lure girls into fake modeling auditions where
they were drugged, raped, and filmed because the website was not treated as a publisher of content
in the failure to warn claim).
4. Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116, 1120 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
+
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website operators liable for the role they played as facilitators and co-profiteers
in the venture.5
There are many other stories like these, where predators, bullies, fraudsters,
and criminals have harmed innocent people because of a lack of reasonable
safeguards on the internet. Victims are unable to obtain justice due to the
challenging reality of locating anonymous defendants and overcoming the high
wall of § 230 immunity for internet intermediaries. 6 Moreover, the proliferation
of fake news and foreign countries waging silent wars through disinformation
campaigns online raises the question—are we doing enough to protect ourselves
online?7
After the Industrial Revolution, tort law developed into a means to enforce
protections for consumers of mass produced food and automobiles as well as
railroad and factory workers. 8 In this new “negligence era,” tort law responded
to death and disaster on a massive scale “as turnpikes and burgeoning industry
were vastly accelerating the pulse of activity and confronting society with an
5. This is the story of Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016). In that case,
three minors who survived nearly 1000 sexual assaults at the behest of sex traffickers sued
Backpage.com, an online classifieds website, for violations of the federal Trafficking Victims
Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 and its state equivalent as well as the state unfair and
deceptive business practices law, among other claims. Id. Backed by amici curiae filings from
several state officials and human rights groups, the plaintiffs lost because of § 230 immunity, even
with evidence that Backpage.com tailored its website to make sex trafficking easier, profited from
sponsoring the sex trafficking ads, and charging a posting fee for them. See Doe v. Backpage.com,
LLC, 817 F.3d 12, 17, 29 (1st Cir. 2016). This was one of the online sex trafficking lawsuits that
made headlines, spurring Congress to act by closing the loophole of § 230 immunity for online sex
trafficking facilitators in 2018. See Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253–56, Apr 11, 2018.
6. For a discussion of cases applying § 230 immunity, see Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2,
at 372 n.169–176. See, e.g., Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655 (7th Cir. 2003) (applying § 230
immunity to defendant web host that allegedly hosted a voyeur website that posted nude videos of
the plaintiffs); Ramey v. Darkside Prods., No. 02-730, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10107 (D.D.C. May
17, 2004) (applying § 230 immunity to defendant adult services advertising website that allegedly
posted intimate photos of plaintiff without her permission); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. America
Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 983 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying § 230 immunity to defendant internet
service provider for providing internet access to a third party who posted defamatory information
about plaintiff); Doe v. Am. Online, Inc., 783 So. 2d 1010, 1011 (Fla. 2001) (applying § 230
immunity to defendant internet service provider after suit by mother of 11-year-old boy who was
lured into sexual conduct, photographed, and videotaped by online predator).
7. See generally Jennifer Williams-Alvarez, Facebook, Twitter, Google Counsel Testimony:
Russian Influence Broader Than Initially Thought, THE RECORDER (Nov. 1, 2017, 2:55 AM),
https://www.law.com/corpcounsel/sites/corpcounsel/2017/10/31/facebook-twitter-googlecounsel-testimony-russian-influence-broader-than-initially-thought/; Jennifer Williams-Alvarez,
Google GC Kent Walker Joins Tech Counsel for Day 2 of Congressional Grilling, THE RECORDER
(Nov. 2, 2017, 2:55 AM), https://www.law.com/therecorder/sites/corpcounsel/2017/11/01/googlegc-kent-walker-joins-tech-counsel-for-day-two-of-congressional-grilling/.
8. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 363-64; see also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 81, at 580-83 (5th ed. 1984); Irwin A. Horowitz,
Norbert L. Kerr & Keith E. Niedermeier, Jury Nullification: Legal and Psychological Perspectives,
66 BROOKLYN L. REV. 1207, 1218 (2001).

2019]

From Innovation to Abuse

599

accident problem of hitherto unprecedented dimensions.”9 Thus, if the
“[i]nternet Revolution is the new Industrial Revolution,”10 then certain types of
consumer harm unique to the internet context are sure to follow, requiring tort
law to hold actors liable for negligently omitting reasonable safety precautions. 11
In 1996, Congress passed the Communications Decency Act (CDA)12 in part
to allow the internet to flourish “with a minimum of government regulation[,]” 13
“to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
[i]nternet and other interactive computer services,”14 and “to ensure vigorous
enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in
obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of a computer.”15 Section 230 of
the Communications Act (part of the CDA) provides what the common law
majority in the United States considers to be immunity when three elements are
met: “[1] the defendant [is] a provider or user of an ‘interactive computer
service’; [2] the asserted claims . . . treat the defendant as a publisher or speaker
of information; and [3] the information [is] provided by another ‘information
content provider.’”16
9. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 364 n.112; see also Danielle Keats Citron & Benjamin
Wittes, The Internet Will Not Break: Denying Bad Samaritans Section 230 Immunity, 86 FORDHAM
L. REV. 401, 422 (2017) (“The nature of the litigation protection that is essential in the early life of
an industry is very different from the proper protection given to a mature one. Many people forget
now that the automobile industry had nearly total product-liability protection in tort for deaths and
injuries in car crashes through the 1960s—even when they resulted from known defects that
manufacturers declined to fix. As the industry matured, the liability protection weakened, and cars
became ‘dramatically safer.’”).
10. Micha Kaufman, The Internet Revolution is the New Industrial Revolution, FORBES (Oct.
5, 2012, 3:42 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/michakaufman/2012/10/05/the-internetrevolution-is-the-new-industrial-revolution/#705ca54547d5.
11. For a discussion comparing the development and maturation of industrial tort law (such
as the automobile industry) with internet law, see Citron & Wittes, supra note 8, at 420–23. Citron
& Wittes argue that the current internet liability regime under § 230 “lacks any kind of sensible
allocation of risk[,]” removing incentives for online providers and websites to engage in any
reasonable standard of care required by other industries. Id.
12. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 133-39, §§ 502–09, Feb. 8, 1996. The relevant parts
discussed in this Comment are § 502 (amending 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994)) and § 509 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2012)).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)(4) (2012).
14. Id. § 230(b)(2). The CDA defines an interactive computer service as “any information
service, system, or access software provider that provides or enables computer access by multiple
users to a computer server, including specifically a service or system that provides access to the
[i]nternet and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational institutions.”
Id. § 230(f)(2).
15. Id. § 230(b)(5).
16. Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001). See also 47
U.S.C. § 230 (2012) (“Protection for ‘Good Samaritan’ blocking and screening of offensive
material. (1) Treatment of publisher or speaker. No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another
information content provider. (2) Civil liability. No provider or user of an interactive computer
service shall be held liable on account of—(A) any action voluntarily taken in good faith to restrict
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Although much of the CDA was struck down as unconstitutional on First
Amendment grounds,17 § 230 of the Act remains as a declaration of Congress’s
1996 policy choice to make the internet free and unregulated.18 Unsurprisingly,
not everybody is comfortable with a policy choice that effectuates broad
immunity to internet service providers, website operators, and website hosts.
For example, some state governments have resorted to guerilla tactics to regulate
internet companies by using a practice known as “jawboning.”19 Furthermore,
with cases capturing national headlines, such as the Backpage.com line of
cases,20 Congress has recently initiated a fresh look at § 230 immunity. In 2018,
Congress passed the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking
Act of 2017, which clarifies that § 230 “was never intended to provide legal
protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution and
websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts
with sex trafficking victims.”21
However well-intentioned the CDA is and however successful it has been at
promoting the free market on the internet, the dangers of a wholly-unregulated,
free-range internet in the interconnected modern world are growing too great to
ignore.22 Leaving internet self-regulation to the discretion of companies
access to or availability of material that the provider or user considers to be obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable, whether or not such
material is constitutionally protected; or (B) any action taken to enable or make available to
information content providers or others the technical means to restrict access to material described
in paragraph (1).”). An “information content provider” is defined as “any person or entity that is
responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information provided through
the [i]nternet or any other interactive computer service.” Id.
17. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 864 (1997); see also infra Section I.B.
18. See infra text accompanying note 41.
19. See Derek E. Bambauer, Against Jawboning, 100 MINN. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2015).
“Jawboning” is “a specific type of informal pressure by a government actor on a private entity: one
that operates at the limit of, or outside, that actor’s authority.” A good example of jawboning is
when state governments sent demand letters to Backpage.com, threatening litigation if they did not
comply with what amounted to informal regulation of their adult services ads, forcing
Backpage.com to choose whether to comply with the unlawful demands (pre-empted by § 230) or
incur the costs of litigation. Id. at 67–69.
20. See, e.g., Florida Abolitionist v. Backpage.com LLC, No. 6:17-cv-00218, 2017 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 75744 (M.D. Fla. May 18, 2017); Complaint, Sojourner Center v. Backpage.com LLC,
Docket No. 2:17-cv-00399 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2017), ECF No. 1; Doe v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817
F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016); J.S. v. Vill. Voice Media Holdings, LLC, 359 P.3d 714 (Wash. 2015);
Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F. Supp. 2d 805 (M.D. Tenn. 2013).
21. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1253, § 2, Apr. 11, 2018.
22. See generally, e.g., Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc. 570 F.3d 1096 (2009) (illustrating the problem
of revenge porn); David S. Levine, Confidentiality Creep and Opportunistic Privacy, 20 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 11 (2017) (discussing Russian exploitation of Facebook advertising to
influence U.S. election); Sen. Klobuchar Issues Statement on Russian Bought Political Google Ads,
TARGETED NEWS SERVICE, (LEXIS) (Oct. 9, 2017, 3:53 AM) (discussing Russian exploitation of
Google ads to spread disinformation); Texas: First Circuit Affirms Dismissal of Lawsuit Against
Backpage.com, Confirms Broad Scope of Section 230 Immunity, U.S. OFFICIAL NEWS (LEXIS),
(Mar. 21, 2016) (discussing Backpage.com classifieds used for sex trafficking of minors); Young
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accountable to stockholders and profits presents a dangerous conflict with the
legitimate interests of consumers. Unfortunately, due to the majority approach
in American courts—a broad immunity interpretation of § 230 immunity—many
victims of internet-related crimes and abuse have been left without meaningful
recourse in tort law.23
This Comment will examine cyber tort law and discuss the history and
purpose of the CDA. In doing so, this Comment provides legislative background
along with an accounting of the common law history of the CDA, specifically
related to § 230 immunity of internet service providers and online intermediaries
(interactive computer services).24 Three main approaches to the interpretation
of internet liability vis-à-vis § 230 have emerged: companies are bound by strict
liability (pre-1996 approach in the U.S.), companies have blanket immunity
(majority approach), and companies have conditional immunity (Seventh and
Ninth Circuit approaches).25
This Comment will analyze each of these approaches and recommend a
solution that more carefully balances the interests of large internet-based
companies with consumer protection. Congress should re-evaluate the language
and stated intent of § 230, making new findings in light of the modern,
technologically-interconnected world. Moreover, this Comment argues that the
2018 amendment to § 230 did not go far enough. Congress should make more
comprehensive policy statements in § 230 regarding consumer safety online and
intermediary liability, and should amend § 230 to implement a notice-takedown
procedure similar to the European model and that of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA), thereby establishing a new standard of care to hold
internet companies accountable to.
Victims of Cyberbullying Twice as Likely to Attempt Suicide and Self-Harm, Study Finds, MEDICAL
XPRESS (LEXIS), (Aug. 16, 2017, 12:51 PM) (discussing cyberbullying on social media and related
suicides); More Than a Quarter of UK Women Experiencing Online Abuse and Harassment
Receive Threats of Physical or Sexual Assault New Research, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (LEXIS), (Nov.
21, 2017) (discussing the prevalence of online harassment, abuse, and threats).
23. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 8, at 413 (discussing how the broad immunity given to
online service providers removes any duty of care to the consumer, “giv[ing] online platforms a
free pass to ignore illegal activities, to deliberately repost illegal material, and to solicit unlawful
activities while ensuring that abusers cannot be identified[,]” often immunizing providers from
activities that extend beyond internet speech).
24. For the purposes of this Comment, the CDA’s term “interactive computer service,”
defined supra note 13, will be used interchangeably with terms such as “online intermediaries,”
defined infra note 53. It appears this is what courts have done, although arguments might be made
that different standards of liability should be applied to an internet service provider, for example,
versus a small website operator. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 371 (“Courts have extended
the meaning of ‘interactive computer services,’ haphazardly lumping together web hosts, websites,
search engines, and content creators into this amorphous category.”).
25. See infra Section II.D for an analysis of a general fourth approach to interactive computer
service liability—the negligence or notice-based standard (European model and Digital Millennium
Copyright Act approach). Although these liability regimes fall outside the purview of § 230, they
are analyzed in this Comment for their comparative value.

602

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:597

II. THE PROGRESSION AND MODERNIZATION OF INTERNET LIABILITY POLICY

Congress passed the Telecommunications Act of 199626 “[t]o promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to secure lower prices and higher
quality services for American telecommunications consumers and encourage the
rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.”27 Title 5 of that
Act, entitled the Communications Decency Act of 1996,28 amended § 223 of the
Communications Act of 193429 by setting criminal penalties for transmitting or
displaying obscene materials to minors via the use of an interactive computer
service30 and offering immunity to those who solely provide network access or
connection (not including those who create “the content of the
communication”).31 Furthermore, the Act provided a good faith defense for
anyone who implemented “good faith, reasonable, effective, and appropriate
actions” to “restrict or prevent access by minors” to obscene materials on the
internet.32
A. Legislative Underpinnings of the Communications Decency Act

The CDA was introduced by Senator Exon, who had no experience with the
internet,33 to shield minors from indecency—especially pornography—on the
internet.34 The CDA was codified under Title 47, “Telegraphs, Telephones, and
26. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 made several amendments to the Communications
Act of 1934.
27. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56, Feb. 8, 1996. The legislative history further reveals
that in passing § 230, Congress wanted “to overrule Stratton-Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other
similar decisions which have treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content
that is not their own because they have restricted access to objectionable material.” H.R. REP. NO.
104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). Congress believed decisions such as Stratton Oakmont, Inc.
v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229 (May 24, 1995) discussed infra,
disempowered parents from “determin[ing] the content of communications their children receive
through interactive computer services.” Id. Interestingly, however, the Conference agreement
specifically states that § 230 immunity does not “apply to so-called ‘cancelbotting,’ in which
recipients of a message respond by deleting the message from the computer systems of others
without the consent of the originator or without having the right to do so.” Id.
28. § 501, 110 Stat. at 133.
29. See 47 U.S.C. § 223 (1994).
30. § 502, 110 Stat. at 133.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Robert Cannon, The Legislative History of Senator Exon’s Communications Decency Act:
Regulating Barbarians on the Information Superhighway, 49 FED. COMM. L.J. 51, 53, 72 (1996).
34. 142 CONG. REC. S714, S718 (daily ed. Feb. 1. 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon) (“[I
introduced the CDA] to protect children from indecent, pornographic communications on the
[i]nternet and other computer services and to protect all Americans from computer obscenity and
electronic stalking. With the passage of this bill, the Congress will help make the Information
Superhighway safer for kids and families to travel. The current lawlessness on the [i]nternet has
opened a virtual Triple-X (XXX)-rated bookstore in the bedrooms of every child with a computer.
This law alone will not clean up the [i]nternet. Parental supervision, industry co-operation along
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Radiotelegraphs,” § 223, “Obscene or harassing phone calls in the District of
Columbia or in interstate or foreign communications.” 35
The CDA was enacted with multiple safe harbor provisions under § 223 to
dampen the blow of its radical approach against obscenity on the internet. 36
Congress intended that internet service providers should be immune from suit as
long as their function was to provide online access, not to create content.37
Senator Exon explained:
The legislation generally does not hold liable any entity that acts like
a common carrier without knowledge of messages it transmits or hold
liable an entity which provides access to another system over which
the access provider has no ownership of content . . . Congress does not
hold the mailman liable for the mail that he[] delivers. 38
Thus, it seems clear that the CDA’s safe harbor provisions, created in the
incipiency of the boom of personal internet use, were originally thought to
safeguard and responsibly facilitate a new market for internet service providers
by protecting them from vicarious liability. 39
Before the enactment of § 223, however, two additional pieces of legislation
were introduced to complement § 223. First, the Family Empowerment
Amendment, which gave “Good Samaritan” protection to providers or users of
interactive computer services that block or screen “offensive material” on the
internet,40 was introduced in response to Senator Exon’s § 223 as a way to ensure
protection against government regulation.41 Later codified under § 230, the
with strict law enforcement, need to work together to make this exciting new technology the family
friendly resource that it should be.”).
35. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000); see also Cannon, supra note 33, at 72–73 (musing how a senator
with no internet experience can draft a bill regulating it); see also infra Section III.A.
36. Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP Liability for Third Party
Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 213–14 (2002); see also Cannon, supra note 33, at 59–60 (discussing
Congress adding defenses to the original version of § 223 amidst strong pressure from the
“interactive computer service industry”).
37. 142 CONG. REC. H1158 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
38. 142 CONG. REC. S714 (daily ed. Feb. 1. 1996) (statement of Sen. Exon).
39. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 190 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
40. Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137-38, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996.
41. Cannon, supra note 33, 67–68. The stated policy goals of the Family Empowerment Act,
later codified under 47 U.S.C. § 230(b) are 5-fold:
(1) to promote the continued development of the [i]nternet . . .

(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
[i]nternet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by . . . regulation . . .
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user control . . .

(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking and
filtering technologies . . .

(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and punish
trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of computer.
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Family Empowerment Act did little more than overrule the 1995 Stratton
Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co. decision that held an internet service
provider liable for defamatory comments posted by a third party on a website.42
As such, the Family Empowerment Act became known as the “bill without a
verb.”43 It was criticized for not actually forbidding government regulation of
the internet;44 but merely allowing congressmen to shallowly “declare their
allegiance to the First Amendment and cyberspace without actually committing
themselves to legislation of significance.”45
Second, Congressman Bliley quietly introduced another amendment to the
House version of the Telecommunications Act on the day of the vote. 46 This
amendment, known as the “Manager’s Amendment,” altered the
telecommunications bill “to appease the interests of big business” by extending
CDA protections to interactive computer services under § 230.47
The Commerce Department, Federal Communications Commission, and
Justice Department uniformly opposed the CDA. The Justice Department
voiced concerns that the CDA would make it difficult to prosecute obscenity on
the internet.48
B. Interpretations of the Communications Decency Act and Internet Tort
Liability

Roughly a year after the enactment of the CDA, the Supreme Court, in Reno
v. A.C.L.U., struck down Senator Exon’s § 223 on First Amendment grounds,
holding that it was an impermissibly vague, over-inclusive, overly-broad,
content-based regulation on speech, likely to “interfere with the free exchange
of ideas.”49 In Reno, the Court opined that because “the [i]nternet is not as
‘invasive’ as radio or television [is in a person’s home],” it has not been subject
to the same level of government regulation.50 Concurring in part and dissenting
§ 509, 110 Stat. at 138.
42. See Cannon, supra note 33, at 68; see also discussion infra Part II. As codified under 47
U.S.C. § 230, the Family Empowerment Act clarified that interactive computer service providers
“shall not be treated as the publisher[s] or speaker[s] of any information provided by another
information content provider.” Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 138, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996;
43. Cannon, supra note 33, at 69.
44. Id. at 68.
45. Id. at 69.
46. Id.
47. Id.; see § 509, 110 Stat. at 133–34; 141 CONG. REC. H8452, H8456 (daily ed. Aug. 4,
1995) (statement of Rep. Bryant) (lamenting that the last minute introduction of the Manager’s
Amendment, drafted in private by corporate interests, without the public’s input, is “an
embarrassment to the House”). Section 230 provides protection from civil liability to “Good
Samaritan” interactive computer service providers or users who essentially filter, inter alia, obscene
or harassing materials from the internet. § 509, 110 Stat. at 134.
48. Cannon, supra note 33, at 69–70.
49. Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, 864, 868, 874, 879, 885 (1997).
50. Id. at 868–69.
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in part, Justice O’Connor explained that, in her view, the CDA is “little more
than an attempt by Congress to create ‘adult zones’ on the [i]nternet[,]” which,
although not necessarily unconstitutional, are unconstitutional as set out in the
CDA.51
Thus, although § 230 originally came paired with § 223 (to appease § 223’s
opposition), as a result of Reno, it now survives alone as the sole remnant of the
CDA, along with its Good Samaritan immunity provision.52 Since Reno, courts
have wrestled with interpreting § 230’s Good Samaritan provision in internet
contexts stretching far beyond § 223’s contemplation of pornography,
indecency, and obscenity. Three main approaches have emerged over the past
20+ years regarding tort liability for interactive computer services and internet
intermediaries.53
First, prior to the enactment of § 230, courts in the United States held
interactive computer services to a strict liability standard. Second, § 230
expressly countermanded the strict liability approach, replacing it with liability
protections for interactive computer services—later interpreted by many courts
as a broad immunity for those service providers. Third, some courts more
recently have interpreted § 230 as providing immunity to interactive computer
services, on the condition they have not participated in the production or
development of the alleged harmful content.
1.

Pre-CDA: Strict Liability for Online Content Publishers

Prior to the passage of the CDA in 1996, government officials considered
“imposing strict liability on ISPs [internet service providers] as a means for
51. Id. at 886 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O’Connor
elaborates:
Our cases make clear that a ‘zoning’ law is valid only if adults are still able to obtain
the regulated speech. If they cannot, the law does more than simply keep children
away from speech they have no right to obtain—it interferes with the rights of adults
to obtain constitutionally protected speech and effectively ‘reduces the adult
population . . . to reading only what is fit for children.
Id. at 888.
52. Schruers, supra note 36, at 213–14.
53. Internet intermediaries are:
private entities that host or index online content. . . . [i]nternet intermediaries wield
considerable control over what we see and hear today, akin to that of influential cable
television and talk radio shows. Examples include search engines like Google,
Microsoft, and Yahoo!; browsers like Mozilla; social network sites like Facebook . . .
; micro-blogging services like Twitter; video-sharing sites like YouTube; and
newsgathering services like Digg.
Danielle Keats Citron & Helen Norton, Intermediaries and Hate Speech: Fostering Digital
Citizenship for Our Information Age, 91 B.U.L. REV. 1435, 1438–39 (2011); see also Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 330–31 (4th Cir. 1997) (“Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter
harmful online speech through the separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve
as intermediaries for other parties’ potentially injurious messages.”).
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controlling some of the [i]nternet’s dangers.”54 Soon, courts in the United States
held interactive computer services on the internet to a strict liability55 publisher
standard for torts such as defamation. 56
In Cubby v. Compuserve, Cubby, a database operator running a journalism
forum sued Compuserve, a competing database operator, alleging that the
journalism forum run by Compuserve published several defamatory statements
regarding Cubby’s service.57 The district court granted the defendant’s motion
for summary judgment because it acted as an unwitting distributor of
information (not a publisher), much like a bookseller, and had no reason to know
of the presence of the defamatory statements.58 Recognizing strict liability for
publishers of information online, the Cubby court thus announced that “the
appropriate standard of liability . . . is whether [the defendant] knew or had
reason to know” of the harmful content.59
In Stratton Oakmont, a New York trial court tackled the question of to whom
liability attaches for defamatory messages posted by a third party on an online
message board.60 In this case, Prodigy Services, an early internet service
provider, moderated and operated an online message board about financial
products.61 When an unidentified third party posted defamatory comments on
the message board, the defamed parties sued Prodigy Services. 62 In defense,
Prodigy Services argued that it was merely a distributor (similar to a bookstore
or library) of the online content, not a publisher (similar to a newspaper); and
thus, it could incur no liability for content posted on its message board.63
However, because Prodigy advertised itself to the public as screening the
content posted on its websites for “family friendly” qualities, by way of
moderators and filtering software, the court found Prodigy to have exercised
54. Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 247 (2005).
55. Strict liability is defined as:
liability in tort imposed on an actor (including a commercial enterprise) for the harms
the actor causes, whether or not the actor is negligent. “Enterprise liability” is
synonymous with strict liability, except that the former phrase connotes a broader
commitment to holding commercial enterprises strictly liable for the harm they cause—
some would say “characteristically cause”—as a matter of first principle.
James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REV. 377, 380 (2002).
56. Schruers, supra note 36, at 232. “Strict liability is the equivalent of publisher liability,
since publisher liability holds publishers strictly liable for the content of their publications,
regardless of their knowledge.” Id.
57. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 139–41.
60. Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 229
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
61. Id. at *1–3.
62. Id.
63. Id. at *6–7.

2019]

From Innovation to Abuse

607

editorial control over the content, similar to a newspaper publisher.64 Alluding
to the difference between active online providers versus passive online
providers, the court stated: “[Prodigy’s] conscious choice, to gain the benefits of
editorial control, has opened it up to a greater liability than . . . other computer
networks that make no such choice.”65 In its finding, the court recognized “the
issues addressed herein may ultimately be preempted by federal law if the
Communications Decency Act . . . , several versions of which are pending in
Congress, is enacted.”66
Distinguished in later cases, and effectively overruled by § 230 of the CDA,67
Stratton Oakmont became known for its application of a strict liability publisher
standard to an internet service provider.68 In Zeran v. America Online, Inc, 129
F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997), the Fourth Circuit opined that strict liability for
interactive computer services creates a disincentive for such companies to selfregulate, because it would impose publisher liability upon any service provider
that attempts to regulate offensive material on their services—exactly the type
of positive citizenship Congress sought to promote by passing § 230 of the
CDA.69 Because of § 230’s Good Samaritan provision and the Zeran holding,
strict liability became an obsolete approach to cyber tort liability.
2.

Post-CDA: Broad Immunity for Interactive Computer Services

Another view, most widely seen in post-1996 case law, is that the CDA gives
broad immunity70 to any interactive computer service that is not the information
content provider71 (publisher or speaker) of alleged tortious content. Contrary
to the strict liability regime of Stratton Oakmont, courts taking this approach
give broad immunity to interactive computer services, even if they edit or alter
content provided by third parties.72
64. Id. at *6–13.
65. Id. at *13.
66. Id. at *14.
67. H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 194 (1996) (Conf. Rep.) (“One of the specific purposes of this
section is to overrule Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy and any other similar decisions which have
treated such providers and users as publishers or speakers of content that is not their own because
they have restricted access to objectionable material. The conferees believe that such decisions
create serious obstacles to the important federal policy of empowering parents to determine the
content of communications their children receive through interactive computer services.”).
68. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
69. Id.
70. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 377; see also, Backpage.com, LLC v. Cooper, 939 F.
Supp. 2d 805, 822 (M.D. Tenn. 2013) (“[c]ourts across the country have repeatedly held that the
CDA’s grant of immunity should be construed broadly.”) (citation omitted).
71. See supra note 15.
72. Adeline A. Allen, Uber and the Communications Decency Act: Why the Ride-Hailing App
Would Not Fare Well Under § 230, 18 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 290, 309 (2017) (citing Batzel v. Smith,
333 F.3d 1018, 1031 (9th Cir. 2003)); Ben Ezra, Weinstein, & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d
980, 986 (10th Cir. 2000); Barrett v. Fonorow, 799 N.E.2d 916, 926–27 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003); and
Donato v. Moldow, 865 A.2d 711, 726 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004)).

608

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 68:597

In Zeran, the Fourth Circuit considered whether an interactive computer
service should face liability for failing to remove defamatory material posted
online using its service, when the defamed party provided notice to the
interactive computer service of the defamatory material. 73 Here, the Fourth
Circuit found that § 230 gives an interactive computer service broad immunity. 74
According to the court, broad immunity is preferable to notice-based liability,
for example, because notice-based liability “reinforces service providers’
incentives to restrict speech and abstain from self-regulation[,]” contrary to the
purposes of § 230.75 Instead, § 230 should “encourage computer service
providers to self-regulate the dissemination of offensive material over their
services.”76 Moreover, tort liability imposed on interactive computer services
“would have an obvious chilling effect” on internet speech. 77
Recognizing further that organizations under a notice liability regime would
have to make immediate editorial decisions every time notice is given regarding
a potentially defamatory statement, the Zeran court opined that such a regime
would give rise to “an impossible burden in the [i]nternet context.”78 Moreover,
a policy of notice-based liability could give third parties “a no-cost means to
create the basis for future lawsuits” by simply giving notice to internet
companies each time something on the internet displeases them, with full
knowledge the company faces an impossible burden in addressing the
multitudinous other similar complaints. 79
In 2014, a Texas appellate court had occasion to apply Zeran’s broad
immunity doctrine. In GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Hollie Toups, plaintiffs sued
GoDaddy.com, an internet domain registrar and web hosting company, for
hosting websites that feature sexually explicit photographs of plaintiffs, without

73. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 327.
74. Id. at 330. (“By its plain language, § 230 creates a federal immunity to any cause of action
that would make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the
service.”).
75. Id. at 333.
76. Id. at 331. The court also recognized that “[Section] 230 forbids the imposition of
publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory
functions”—yet another departure from the publisher strict liability era of Stratton Oakmont. Id.
Even more, the court recognized that § 230 also protects distributors, not just publishers. Id. at 332.
Once the potential plaintiff provides notice of the presence of defamatory material to the interactive
computer service, the computer service transforms from the role of distributor to publisher, because
it must now make editorial decisions—“whether to publish, edit, or withdraw the posting”—
explicitly bringing it within the protection of § 230. Id. at 332.
77. Id. at 331.
78. Id. at 333. Ostensibly, the court’s analysis here depends on the idea that millions of
internet users publishing such a vast amount of content on the internet would create an editorial
burden that internet providers simply cannot reasonably bear. See Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844,
850 (1997).
79. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
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their consent.80 Conceding that GoDaddy.com did not create the offending
images, the plaintiffs nevertheless sued for negligence, inter alia, on a theory
that GoDaddy.com was aware of the content, failed to remove it, and profited
from it.81 Plaintiffs also alleged that GoDaddy.com hosted these websites with
full knowledge the websites were engaged in illegal activities, such as the
publication of child pornography.82 The court found that because Congress did
not make an exception to § 230 immunity for tort claims brought under criminal
statutes, such claims are barred.83
In similar fashion, many courts over the past few years have applied the words
of § 230 very literally, often dismissing lawsuits at the outset whenever an
interactive computer service has been sued for a cause of action in tort. 84
3. Chipping Away at Broad Immunity: Conditional Immunity for
Interactive Computer Services

The third general approach courts have taken in interpreting § 230 immunity
is “conditional immunity.”85 This approach gives interactive computer services
broad immunity for torts related to third party content, but conditions that
immunity on “minimal responsibilities implicit in Section 230.”86 In 2008, two

80. GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Hollie Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752, 753 (Tex. App. 2014). This is a
case of revenge porn. Revenge porn is defined as: “sexually explicit images of a person posted
online without that person’s consent especially as a form of revenge or harassment.” Revenge Porn,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/revenge%
20porn (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
81. GoDaddy.com, 429 S.W.3d at 753.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 760; see also, Doe v. Myspace, Inc. 474 F. Supp. 2d 843 (W.D. Tex. 2007) aff’d,
528 F.3d 413 (5th Cir. 2008) (finding § 230 immunity is not limited to defamation lawsuits, but
also applies to negligence, negligence per se, intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion
of privacy, civil conspiracy, and distribution of child pornography suits); Doe v. Mark Bates, No.
5:05-CV-91, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 93348, at *12 (E.D. Tex. Dec. 27, 2006) (“Congress decided
not to allow private litigants to bring civil claims based on their own beliefs that a service provider’s
actions violated the criminal laws.”).
84. See, e.g., Fields v. Twitter, Inc., 217 F. Supp. 3d 1116 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (motion to dismiss
granted for Twitter as interactive computer service following claims under the Anti-Terrorism Act
for death of husbands); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096 (9th Cir. 2009) (motion to dismiss
granted on tort claim of negligent undertaking); Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354 (D.C. Cir.
2014) (motion to dismiss granted in favor of Facebook on tort claims of negligent breach of duty
of care and assault after Palestinian death threats to Jews was communicated over Facebook); Doe
v. Backpage.com, LLC, 817 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2016) (motion to dismiss granted to Backpage.com
based on alleged violations of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act).
85. Schruers, supra note 36, at 208.
86. Id.
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seminal cases87 on the scope of § 230 immunity were decided—both as a result
of allegedly discriminatory postings in violation of the Fair Housing Act.88
In Chicago Lawyers’ Commission for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v.
Craigslist, Inc., the Seventh Circuit diverged from the Fourth Circuit’s broad
immunity interpretation of § 230 laid out in Zeran. Here, the Chicago Lawyers’
Committee for Civil Rights Under the Law sued Craigslist 89 under the Fair
Housing Act, alleging Craigslist posted housing ads made by third parties that
included discriminatory language, such as “no minorities” and “no children.”90
Referencing its earlier opinion in Doe v. GTE, the court found that the
interpretation of § 230 is not necessarily “a general prohibition of civil liability
for web-site operators.”91 Instead, the court mused “perhaps § 230(c)(1)
forecloses any liability that depends on deeming the ISP a ‘publisher’ . . . while
permitting the states to regulate ISPs in their capacity as intermediaries.” 92
That same year, in Fair Housing Council v. Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit
found that a website operator, Roommates.com, was unprotected by § 230
because the website had elicited illegal content and made “aggressive use of it
in conducting its business.”93 In that case, Roommates.com, a website that
helped people to connect with others in hopes of finding a roommate, required
its subscribers to select their sex, sexual orientation, and parental status in order
to sign up.94 This information was used to complete the subscriber’s profile as
well as to help Roommates.com send targeted notifications to subscribers
87. These cases were important not only for their analyses of § 230, but also because they
help further define the types of companies that fall under the § 230 definition of “interactive
computer service.” See supra note 13 for a definition of interactive computer services. See also
47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012); see also, Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d
1157, 1162 n.6 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Today, the most common interactive computer services are
websites.”).
88. The Fair Housing Act makes it illegal:
[t]o make, print, or publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that
indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on race, color, religion,
sex, handicap, familial status, or national origin, or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination.
42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2012).
89. Craigslist is a website that “provides an electronic meeting place for those who want to
buy, sell or rent housing (and many other goods and services). Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil
Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666, 668 (7th Cir. 2008).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 669; see also Doe v. GTE Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659–60 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding the
district court’s statutory interpretation—that on one hand, § 230(c)(2) provides immunity when an
interactive computer service censors content, while on the other hand, § 230(c)(1) provides
immunity when an interactive computer service refrains from censoring content—to be an unlikely
legislative intent since this incentivizes interactive computer services to be “indifferent to the
content of information they host or transmit.”); see also, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2) (2012).
92. Chicago Lawyers, 519 F.3d at 670 (quoting GTE Corp., 347 F.3d at 660).
93. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
94. Id. at 1161.
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regarding available roommates who are a match. 95 The demographic
information was solicited by Roommates.com and by means of dropdown
selection menus on its website, completion of which was mandatory, this
facilitated users in discriminating against each other, in violation of the Fair
Housing Act. In these circumstances, the court held that Roommates.com had
forfeited its § 230 immunity by itself becoming an information content
provider.96
C. Current Congressional Efforts to Amend Section 230

In 2017, in response to widespread coverage and media attention on the series
of Backpage.com cases, Congress introduced two bills to amend Section 230 in
an effort to provide greater protection for victims of online sex trafficking.97
Both bills, the Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017 and the Allow States
and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, clarify that § 230
should not be used to shield interactive computer services from criminal and
civil liability under the federal human trafficking laws.98 Taking a fresh look at
§ 230 immunity, the House version states: “Section 230 of the Communications
Act of 1934 (47 U.S.C. [§] 230; commonly known as the ‘Communications
Decency Act of 1996’) was never intended to provide legal protection to
websites that facilitate traffickers in advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts
with sex trafficking victims.”99 In April 2018, the Allow States and Victims to
Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 was enacted, adding new language to
§ 230 clarifying that civil actions brought under criminal sex trafficking laws are
not limited or impaired by § 230.100
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE VARIOUS INTERNET LIABILITY APPROACHES
A. Why Strict Liability Failed

The first approach to handling liability for online entities, as seen in the
Stratton Oakmont era—strict liability101—has the benefit of consistent risk
allocation, but at the expense of rigidity and with possible chilling effects on
innovation and speech. Discussing the evolution of strict liability in industry,
Prosser and Keeton write:
[t]here is a strong and growing tendency, where there is blame on
neither side, to ask, in view of the exigencies of social justice, who can
95. Id. at 1167.
96. Id. at 1170.
97. Compare Stop Enabling Sex Traffickers Act of 2017, S. 1693, 115th Cong. (2017) with
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, H.R. 1865, 115th Cong.
(2017).
98. Id.; see generally 18 U.S.C. § 1591 (2012).
99. H.R. 1865.
100. Pub. L. No. 115-164, 132 Stat. 1254, § 4, Apr 11, 2018 (codified at 47 U.S.C. 230(e)(5)).
101. See supra note 55.
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best bear the loss and hence to shift the loss by creating liability where
there has been no fault . . . . The courts have tended to lay stress upon
the fact that the defendant is acting for his own purposes, and is
seeking a benefit or a profit from such activities, and that he is in a
better position to administer the unusual risk by passing it on to the
public than is the innocent victim. The problem is dealt with as one
of allocating a more or less inevitable loss to be charged against a
complex and dangerous civilization, and liability is imposed upon the
party best able to shoulder it.102
Therefore, because interactive computer services and online intermediaries are
acting for their own purposes (i.e., benefiting or profiting from the activities on
their platforms), and because they are more likely than an individual person to
be able to bear the risk, strict liability seems like a fitting solution to the question
of who should bear the risk of the inherent dangers of cyberspace.
However, some commentators think public opinion favors the more faultbased negligence standard in tort liability because, ethically, it makes sense to
hold someone liable when he or she is at fault. Conversely, in strict liability, an
enterprise is held liable even for a no-fault accident.103 In Cubby, the court
explained that the First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and press defend
interactive computer services from strict liability for unknowingly distributing
tortious material over the internet—especially when the interactive computer
service had little or no editorial control over the content. 104 Giving credence to
this standard, the Stratton Oakmont court in turn found the defendant liable
because the efforts it made to control and filter its content made it a publisher,
not a distributor like Compuserve.105 Later, the Zeran court suggested that
holding an interactive computer service liable for the vast amount of content
created by third parties on the internet created a strict liability regime.106 This
approach to liability on the internet, the antithesis of Congress’s expressed intent
for the CDA, would likely have a chilling effect on internet speech.107
Essentially, strict liability was rejected because it causes a “Good Samaritan,”
who is trying to filter or censor obscene content, to be treated as a publisher in
the eyes of the law, and thus liable for any harmful remaining content. Congress
passed § 230 with the intent of promoting private entity censorship of
“objectionable” material on the internet and removing any deterrents from doing
102. KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, § 75, at 536–37 (internal quotation marks omitted).
103. Henderson, supra note 55, at 380, 386. “Only in a limited class of cases, those in which
plaintiffs are completely passive victims of risky activities knowingly undertaken by commercial
enterprises, are ethical arguments favoring strict liability persuasive.” Id. at 386.
104. Cubby, Inc. v. Compuserve, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 135, 139–40 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
105. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., No. 31063/94, 1995 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS
229, *9–11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
106. Schruers, supra note 36, at 246; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333
(4th Cir. 1997).
107. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
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so.108 Thus, because strict liability creates a conflict with Congress’s intent for
§ 230, it cannot survive as a theory of liability in cyber torts unless § 230 is
changed.
B. “The Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card:”109 Broad Immunity from Internet
Liability

The second approach to § 230, as found in Zeran, that Congress intended
broad, if not blanket immunity, 110 for interactive computer services, seems to
have the most support in American courts since Zeran.111 This is most likely
due to the common-sense policy set out in § 230 of furthering the free market on
the internet and fostering the advancement of an important technology. 112 Also,
Zeran assumes that administratively, “[i]t would be impossible for service
providers to screen each of their millions of postings for possible problems.” 113
Furthermore, this broad immunity approach advances the greatest level of
protection of free speech on the internet by reducing service providers’
motivation to censor or restrict information provided by third parties; although
courts have interpreted the purpose of the CDA’s immunity provision to
encourage self-regulation.114
Although a broadly construed immunity for web operators and internet
companies is meant to promote self-regulation by the web industry, it more
likely removes the incentive for companies to self-regulate, because § 230 acts
like a “get-out-of-jail-free card.”115 This disincentive for interactive computer
services to ensure their web products and services are safe should cause concern
to consumers.
Although most courts fall in line with Zeran’s broad approach to the CDA,
some have raised questions about it. For example, in Klayman v. Zuckerberg,
where Facebook was sued for not promptly removing a Palestinian Facebook
page that called for Muslims to rise up and kill Jews, the D.C. Circuit considered
whether Facebook’s failure to remove the content constituted publishing for
liability purposes.116 Although the D.C. Circuit ultimately adopted Zeran’s
approach, it recognized that publication of tortious material not only means
108. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
109. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016).
110. Andrew M. Sevanian, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act: A “Good
Samaritan” Law Without the Requirement of Acting as a “Good Samaritan,” 21 UCLA ENT. L.
REV. 121, 126 (2014).
111. See supra Section I.B.
112. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
113. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
114. See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 37, 41 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001)
(explaining Congress chose to protect online intermediaries from liability for harmful third-party
content because such immunity would encourage the intermediaries to self-regulate).
115. Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 853 (9th Cir. 2016).
116. Klayman v. Zuckerberg, 753 F.3d 1354, 1358–59 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
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communicating that material, but also means failure to remove that material.117
This recognition rekindles a familiar analysis made by the Stratton Oakmont
court in 1995: where Prodigy held itself out to the public as filtering harmful
content from its website, thus exercising editorial control over third-party
content, it became liable for any harmful material it failed to remove.118 Thus,
courts dealing with the modern complexities of cyber torts beyond the context
of 1990s defamation suits recognize the temptation of applying a strict liability
standard, but ultimately tend to feel more comfortable applying the more popular
broad immunity approach to § 230 liability.
C. Moving in the Right Direction: Some Standard of Care is Better than None
at All

The third approach to § 230, the conditional immunity approach pioneered
primarily by the Seventh Circuit in Chicago Lawyers and the Ninth Circuit in
Roommates, is a more even-handed approach because it takes great care to
safeguard internet speech, while engaging in the difficult balancing of free
market interests with consumer protection.
Recall that, in Chicago Lawyers, the Seventh Circuit opened up the door to
possible intermediary liability,119 and in Roommates, the defendant website was
deprived of § 230 immunity because it was directly involved in developing and
making use of certain illegal content on its website and because it profited from
it.120 The Ninth Circuit’s condition is this: “If you don’t encourage illegal
content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will
be immune.”121 This seems fair enough and has worked in favor of injured
plaintiffs on a few occasions in the context of failure to warn claims. 122 Because
“[i]nternet intermediaries often profit directly from transactions that effectively
would be banned in an offline environment[,]”123 keeping a watchful eye out for
this behavior and imposing conditional immunity on intermediaries can be an
effective way to encourage them to self-regulate more attentively.
The drawback to this approach is that it opens up the door to tort liability for
interactive computer services—a result that the Zeran court feared would chill

117. Id.
118. See discussion supra Section I.B.1.
119. Chi. Lawyers’ Comm. for Civil Rights Under Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc., 519 F.3d 666,
669–70 (7th Cir. 2008).
120. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1172 (9th Cir. 2008).
121. Id. at 1175; see also Anthony v. Yahoo! Inc., 421 F. Supp. 2d 1257, 1262 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
(finding an online dating service cannot claim § 230 immunity, when it created false dating profiles,
sending them to soon-to-be-expired subscribers to convince them to renew their subscriptions,
because it was an information content provider).
122. See generally Beckman v. Match.com, LLC, 668 Fed. App’x 759 (9th Cir. 2016); Doe v.
Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2016).
123. Mann & Belzley, supra note 54, at 247.
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internet speech and create prohibitive burdens for interactive computer
services.124
D. Evaluating the Merits of Non-CDA Liability Regimes: The Negligence125 or
Notice-Liability Approach to Interactive Computer Service Liability 126

A fourth approach to interactive computer service liability presently does not
exist in the United States with respect to interpreting the CDA in cyber tort
claims. A negligence or “notice-based” liability regime is, however, prevalent
in Europe and modeled in U.S. copyright law under the DMCA.127 This
approach would impose the common law distributor liability upon interactive
computer services if they are given notice, or otherwise made aware of the
tortious content on their websites or services.128 In such cases when notice is
given, the service provider would have a duty of care to remove the tortious
content or otherwise remedy the issue.129
1.

The European Approach: Imposing a Duty of Care

In 2000, the European Union (EU) passed the Electronic Commerce
Directive, which provides rules for EU member countries to adopt regarding ecommerce, communications, and liability for intermediary service providers. 130
The Electronic Commerce Directive creates a duty of care for ISPs—that they
should take down tortious materials upon notice.131
In a recent case, Delfi AS v. Estonia, the Grand Chamber of the European
Court of Human Rights agreed with Estonia’s Supreme Court that an online
news website, Delfi AS, could be held liable for third-party user comments
containing threats that were posted on its website.132 In this case, the Delfi AS
124. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997).
125. “‘Negligence’ refers to the failure of an actor (including a commercial enterprise) to take
reasonable care to prevent harm caused by the actor’s conduct.” Henderson, supra note 55, at 380.
126. Schruers, supra note 36, at 232. Schruers describes this approach as distributor liability,
“since distributors are held to the same ‘knew or should have known’ rule commonly applied in
negligence regimes.” Id.
127. See Pub. L. No. 105-304, 12 Stat. 2878, § 512, Oct. 28, 1998. Furthermore, the purpose
of this section is not to produce an in-depth comparative analysis with European laws, which is not
undertaken here; but rather, to use them for illustrative purposes. Similarly, the following
discussion on the DMCA is used to illustrate how a notice-takedown regime might operate in the
United States.
128. Schruers, supra note 36, at 235.
129. Id.
130. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 343 n.27.
131. Id. at 392–94. Rustad and Koenig offer criticism of the EU’s Electronic Commerce
Directive on the basis that it is a collection of standards instead of regulations, leaving specific
notice-takedown procedures to be legislated by EU member states—an environment that could lead
to over-censorship of free expression online. Id. at 394 n.304, 407. See infra note 131 and
accompanying textual material for an illustration of Rustad and Koenig’s criticism.
132. Delfi AS v. Estonia, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 64569/09, at 61 (Grand Chamber 2015).
This case was brought before the European Court of Human Rights by Delfi AS (a news company
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removed the threatening comments upon notice, after approximately six
weeks.133 Although the website allegedly followed the Electronic Commerce
Directive’s notice and takedown provision, the Grand Chamber affirmed the
ruling of the Estonian Supreme Court, finding the website liable as a publisher.
In its opinion, the Grand Chamber made a distinction between the duty of care
for a commercial news website and that of a less professionally-managed
website, such as a social networking site,134 insinuating that Delfi AS, as a
sophisticated player, has a greater obligation to effectively censor hate speech
and incitement to violence (neither of which is protected speech in the EU) from
its website.135
In the United Kingdom, internet service providers have an “innocent
dissemination” defense to lawsuits when they can show they were not aware of
tortious content.136 However, to assert this defense requires the defendant
company to show it exercised reasonable care in publishing the content at
issue.137 For example, in Godfrey v. Demon Internet, a physics professor alleged
defamatory content about him was placed online. 138 He forthwith notified the
defendant ISP to have it removed, but the ISP did not remove it until two weeks
later.139 The English court ruled that because the defendant ISP was provided
with notice, it was unable to use the innocent dissemination defense.140
Other European countries that operate under civil law systems take a similar
approach. For example, under the German Teleservices Act Section 5, Germany
provides for ISP liability for content posted by third parties if the ISP has
knowledge of the content and there is a reasonable and feasible way to block
it.141 French civil law requires ISPs to remove objectionable content promptly
upon notice—failing to do so could result in liability. 142 To assess liability,

registered in Estonia), under the claim that the adverse ruling of the Estonian Supreme Court
violated Delfi AS’s right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Id. at 3–4. For information on Article 10, see European Convention on Human
Rights, Article 10, EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL OF EUROPE (2010),
http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf.
133. Delfi AS v. Estonia, App. No. 64569/09, at 7–8.
134. Id. at 8, 45–46.
135. Id. at 58–59; see generally id. for discussion and analysis concerning publisher versus
intermediary liability in the European context.
136. Schruers, supra note 36, at 227.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 228; see also Act on the Utilization of Teleservices (Gesetz über die Nutzung von
Telediensten), 1997 (Ger.), https://germanlawarchive.iuscomp.org/?p=694#5.
142. Schruers, supra note 36, at 230.
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French courts focus on the conduct of the ISP after notice of tortious material is
given.143
2.

The DMCA: Paving the Way for Notice-Based Liability on the Internet

Enacted into law in the United States in 1998, the DMCA also creates a noticebased liability regime for online service providers, limited to the realm of
copyright infringement.144 In part, “[t]he DMCA was enacted to strike a new
balance between the viable operations of OSP’s [online service providers 145] and
the need to enforce copyright protection.”146 Its “immunity” provision protects
service providers from monetary liability due to third-party copyright violations
as long as (1) the service provider is unaware of the alleged copyright
infringement on its website or service and (2) the service provider adheres to the
“take down” provision by promptly, upon notice, removing or blocking access
to the allegedly infringing material.147 Moreover, because the burden is on the
complaining party to give notice, a service provider is not required to actively
monitor its website or internet service for copyright violations.148
The negligence or notice-based approach espoused in Europe and utilized in
the DMCA, has the benefit of providing a clear “reasonable” standard of care
for companies to follow, while providing an innocent dissemination defense to
help protect companies. Moreover, applying a notice-takedown approach to
cyber tort liability has the benefit of

143. Xavier Amadei, Note, Standards of Liability for Internet Service Providers: A
Comparative Study of France and the United States with A Specific Focus on Copyright,
Defamation, and Illicit Content, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 189, 197 (2002).
144. Schruers, supra note 36, at 236.
145. “‘[S]ervice provider’ means an entity offering the transmission, routing, or providing of
connections for digital online communications, between or among points specified by a user, of
material of the user’s choosing, without modification to the content of the material as sent or
received.” Pub. L. No. 105-304, 12 Stat. 2878, § 512, Oct. 28, 1998.
146. § 512, 12 Stat. at 2878; Costar Grp., Inc. v. Loopnet, Inc., 164 F. Supp. 2d 688, 698 (D.
Md. 2001).
147. § 512, 12 Stat. at 2878; Costar Grp.,164 F. Supp. 2d at 698; see also ALS Scan, Inc. v.
RemarQ Cmtys., Inc., 239 F.3d 619, 625 (4th Cir. 2001) (“The DMCA was enacted both to preserve
copyright enforcement on the Internet and to provide immunity to service providers from copyright
infringement liability for ‘passive,’ ‘automatic’ actions in which a service provider’s system
engages through a technological process initiated by another without the knowledge of the service
provider. This immunity, however, is not presumptive, but granted only to ‘innocent’ service
providers who can prove they do not have actual or constructive knowledge of the infringement, as
defined under any of the three prongs of 17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1). The DMCA’s protection of an
innocent service provider disappears at the moment the service provider loses its innocence, i.e., at
the moment it becomes aware that a third party is using its system to infringe. At that point, the
Act shifts responsibility to the service provider to disable the infringing matter, ‘preserving the
strong incentives for service providers and copyright owners to cooperate to detect and deal with
copyright infringements that take place in the digital networked environment.’” (citations omitted)).
148. Donald P. Harris, Time to Reboot?: DMCA 2.0, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 801, 803–04 (2015).
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harmoniz[ing] elements from the common law of distributor liability,
the [DMCA’s] . . . notice-and-takedown procedure, and the European
Union’s E-Commerce Directive . . . . [And, it might] jumpstart the
field of cybertorts so that it can develop into an effective social control
mechanism for cyberspace.149
Furthermore, in U.S. common law, a negligence (fault-based) approach to tort
liability is supported in tradition and seen as fairer than a strict liability. 150
Negligence-based liability rationally has more focused deterrence value than
strict liability and achieves “a substantial measure of loss distribution.” 151
Finally, the DMCA regime does what the CDA fails to do: it saves interactive
computer services from the prohibitive expenses of web content monitoring by
shifting the burden to the complaining party to give initial notice of
objectionable material, and in doing so, it gives the consumer a clear-cut way to
begin the process of mitigating the harm being caused.152 This provides
protection for ISPs against “uncertain and crippling damages, which would
curtail the development of the [i]nternet[,] . . . encouraging the continued
expansion and development of the [i]nternet”153—in large part, the same policy
result contemplated by the CDA.154
The problems with the negligence or notice-based approach, however, are
manifold. First, it can drain companies’ coffers by enabling frivolous suits of
the kind warned about in Zeran, encouraging companies to settle to save money
on litigation.155 Second, it could encourage service providers to over censor
information on the internet as a way of avoiding notice-based liability and costs
associated with handling notice and takedown procedures. 156 Furthermore, it
might encourage companies to go overseas to find more favorable laws. 157
Finally, it might increase extortion by lawsuit, creating a de facto injunction on

149. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 343–44. Rustad and Koenig argue that by removing
the broad immunity protections of § 230 from ISPs and implementing a cybertort notice-takedown
policy, tort law will catalyze further legal reform (as it historically has done in other arenas), which
will increase consumer protection on the internet. Id.
150. Henderson, supra note 55, at 386.
151. Henderson, supra note 55, at 380, 386; see also, Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and
the Possible End of the Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 GA. L. REV. 601, 636 (1992)
(explaining some tort law scholars, such as Prosser and Keeton, view moral responsibility, not loss
distribution, to be the proper aim of tort liability).
152. Cf. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 333 (4th Cir. 1997) (imagining the
“impossible burden” of monitoring all transmissions and making judgment calls on each potentially
objectionable piece of information that an interactive computer service would face in a noticeliability regime).
153. Harris, supra note 147, at 803–04.
154. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
155. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333; see also Schruers, supra note 36, at 228.
156. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333.
157. Schruers, supra note 36, at 229.
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internet content every time a person might feel offended by something. 158 In
economic terms, this might “externalize liability costs, transforming them into
social costs by allowing [offended or otherwise] self-interested plaintiffs to
control the content of public discourse.”159
IV. MODERNIZING THE CDA

A. Internet Liability Will No Longer Stifle Technological Growth

With such rudimentary knowledge of the future growth and impact of the
internet, Congress showed great foresight when it attached the Good Samaritan
provision to § 230 of the CDA in 1996. Allowing the fear of internet indecency
to lead internet policy back in 1996, while leaving interactive computer services
overly exposed to liability, could have crippled Silicon Valley’s innovation and
global leadership in the technology sector.
However, at the time of this writing, 23 years have passed since the CDA was
enacted into law. We now know that the internet is fundamentally different from
telegraphs, telephones, and radiotelegraphs; and internet crime, abuse, and
harassment takes “[o]bscene or harassing phone calls” to a whole new level. 160
Moreover, tech innovation and the free market on the internet are arguably no
longer in danger of being stifled in their incipiency. 161 According to the Ninth
Circuit:
The [i]nternet is no longer a fragile new means of communication that
could easily be smothered in the cradle by overzealous enforcement of
158. Id. at 244; see also Zeran, 129 F.3d. at 333.
159. Schruers, supra note 36, at 244. An externality is defined as “[a] consequence or side
effect of one’s economic activity, causing another to benefit without paying or to suffer without
compensation.” Externality, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
160. See Cannon, supra note 33, at 53, 57, 73–75 (discussing how the CDA was conceivably
based on an assumption that the internet is analogous to other commonly regulated
telecommunications devices, such as telephones, and should therefore be similarly regulated for
decency); Compare 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000) (Title 47 is named “Telegraphs, Telephones, and
Radiotelegraphs”), with 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012) (Title 47 is renamed “Telecommunications”); see
also supra Section I.A. For an in-depth description of the contours of the internet as understood
by the judiciary, see generally Reno v. A.C.L.U., 521 U.S. 844, at 849–57 (1997).
161. See Citron & Wittes, supra note 8, at 422 (“‘The law’s reaction to claims against such
large actors for new types of harms typically goes through’ distinct phases. Law first recognizes
the new form of harm but not the benefit that the new technology has occasioned. This drives it to
adapt existing theories of liability to reach that harm. After the technology’s benefits become
apparent, law then reverses course, seeing its earlier awards of liability as threats to technological
progress and granting sweeping protection to the firms in the new industry. Once the technology
becomes better established, law recognizes that not all liability awards threaten its survival. Law
then separates activities that are indispensable to the pursuit of the new industry from behavior that
causes unnecessary harm to third parties. This is what the celebrated Palsgraf v. Long Island
Railroad Co. case accomplished and much of the reason the negligence standard emerged. As the
new technology becomes more familiar, law refines the distinction between acceptable and
unacceptable harms, at times setting liability rules to drive the development of less destructive
means of carrying out the necessary functions.”).
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laws and regulations applicable to brick-and-mortar businesses.
Rather, it has become a dominant—perhaps a preeminent—means
through which commerce is conducted. And its vast reach into the
lives of millions is exactly why we must be careful not to exceed the
scope of immunity provided by Congress . . . .162
“[Moreover,] [t]he Communications Decency Act was not meant to create a
lawless no-man’s-land on the [i]nternet.”163 These insights are important to
consider as internet technology continues to grow, pervading the personal lives
of almost everyone and connecting us to countless potential sources of harm. In
a disturbing, but predictable, turn of events, the internet has become one of the
most effective and efficient ways to commit crime164 and engage in often
anonymous, harmful, anti-social behavior.165
Thus, Congress should modernize its internet policy in favor of a more wellbalanced free market and consumer protection analysis and amend § 230
accordingly. Because internet regulation could prove harmful to innovation,
driving American technology companies to incorporate overseas, the commonsense solution is to amend § 230 to include a notice-based harmful content
removal provision similar to that of the DMCA, which is more in line with
European doctrine.166 Having a harmonious approach to liability on the internet
across the West could help bring consistency across borders, mitigating
incentives for online intermediaries to incorporate overseas. 167
B. A Call to Amend § 230: Removing Good Samaritan Protection from Bad
Samaritans

Some commentators have suggested analytical workarounds for § 230
immunity. For example, one commentator suggests the ridesharing service Uber
should not be given § 230 immunity because it sets prices on its ridesharing
application, making it an information content provider.168 Other commentators
point out the inevitability of government regulation of the internet and suggest
regulatory solutions,169 while others propose different variations of the
aforementioned liability schemes.170 However, because Congress recently
162. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1165 n.15 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 1164.
164. Europol, Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment 2017, (2017)
https://www.europol.europa.eu/sites/default/files/documents/iocta.pdf.
(discussing
cyberdependent crimes such as malware, critical infrastructure attacks, and data breaches as well as
online financial crime, sexual exploitation of children, proliferation of terrorist ideologies, and
tampering with democratic elections).
165. See supra notes 5, 21, 84 and accompanying text.
166. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 407–08.
167. See generally id. at 343.
168. Allen, supra note 72, at 318. Under § 230, an information content provider itself is not
immune from liability. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
169. See Mann & Belzley, supra note 54, at 250.
170. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 343.
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amended § 230 to ensure facilitators of online sex trafficking cannot hide behind
its immunity provision,171 now is a crucial time to re-evaluate these solutions to
internet abuse and overbroad application of § 230 immunity.
Interactive computer services should not retain the broad immunity available
under the current majority interpretation of § 230, but should instead be
reachable via tort actions when victims can show there was negligence or a
failure to warn.172 Thus, the scope of § 230 immunity should be amended to
clarify that broad immunity should no longer be the default approach. Rather, §
230 should be expanded beyond the context of the 1990s focus on publishing,
defamation, and Good Samaritan filtering of pornography, to clarify that
interactive computer service action or inaction falling within the realm of
facilitation, gross negligence, willful ignorance, or recklessness should not be
protected, despite the fact that a third-party is the source of the harmful content
or activity.173 While the April 2018 amendment was a necessary and
constructive step for updating § 230, it was not broad enough as to establish a
standard of care applicable to other harms beyond the facilitation of sex
trafficking.
In support of creating this reasonable standard of care for interactive computer
services, there should be a formalized notice-based takedown procedure in place
to give consumers a self-defense option against harmful content or mechanisms
and to encourage identification and reporting of various abuses, such as
incitement to violence, bullying, revenge porn, fraudulent schemes, criminal
enterprises, and foreign meddling. Although some might argue this approach to
liability will burden interactive computer services due to frivolous litigation, this
approach is the most balanced approach available. It gives consumers a
reasonable measure of protection, shifting the burden to them to report problems,
without increasing the burden on interactive computer services by implementing
a formalized regulatory approach.174
Furthermore, Congress should re-evaluate § 230 for applicability to the
modern-day internet reality. In drafting § 230, Congress made the effort to lay
out five “findings” regarding the great potential and utility of the internet175
171. See supra notes 5, 22, 102 and accompanying text.
172. See generally Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
173. See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 7, §§ 34, 53, at 208–14, 359.
174. Self-regulation of the internet industry through notice and takedown and litigation will
continue to encourage Silicon Valley to do what it does best—innovate. Creating a standard of
care for interactive computer services to adhere to should encourage positive citizenship in the form
of forcing the industry to address the problem of consumer safety with high-tech solutions.
175. Congress stated:
(a) Findings.—The Congress finds the following:
(1) The rapidly developing array of [i]nternet and other interactive computer services
available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the
availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens.
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along with five policy points (seeking to protect the growth of the internet in its
incipiency);176 yet, in enacting the CDA, Congress failed to lay out findings or
policy in the Act pertaining to the potential dangers of the internet beyond
obscenity, stalking, and harassment.
From the text of the statute itself, as well as from its legislative history, the
CDA was introduced primarily to combat internet pornography. 177 But what the
CDA lacks overall is a comprehensive policy discussion analyzing some of the
other consequences and dangers of a free and open internet sans any incentive
for civilized and responsible behavior. This is a task that Congress should
undertake in re-evaluating the CDA and § 230 immunity.
Thus, in addition to the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex
Trafficking Act of 2017), Congress should amend § 230 to clarify that upon
notice of harmful activity occurring via a website, the responsible interactive
service provider would breach its reasonable duty of care by ignoring an active
illicit enterprise or course of conduct that is harming people, as discussed
above.178
In drafting the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act
of 2017, Congress explicitly recognized that they never intended § 230 to
immunize interactive computer services that facilitate bad acts, specifically the
advertising of sex trafficking victims.179 This opens the door to questions of
what other kinds of bad actors Congress did not intend § 230 to provide
immunity to180—questions of which Congress needs to provide an answer.
V. CONCLUSION

According to Mann and Belzley:
The pirates have arrived on the high seas of the online world and the
lack of regulation makes their predations all too easy. The time has
(2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they
receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology
develops.
(3) The [i]nternet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for a true
diversity of political discourse, unique opportunities for cultural development, and
myriad avenues for intellectual activity.
(4) The [i]nternet and other interactive computer services have flourished, to the benefit
of all Americans, with a minimum of government regulation.
(5) Increasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of political,
educational, cultural, and entertainment services.
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 137–38, § 509, Feb. 8, 1996.
176. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
177. See § 502, 110 Stat. at 133; H.R. REP. NO. 104-458, at 187–90 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).
178. See Rustad & Koenig, supra note 2, at 408.
179. See supra note 22.
180. For example: cyberbullies and revenge pornographers, people who incite violence and
terrorism, sexual predators, child pornographers, fraudsters, and foreign intelligence organizations.
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come for lawmakers to implement sensible policies designed to reign
in the pirates while minimizing the impact on law-abiding [i]nternet
users.181
For several years, § 230 successfully protected the growth of internet-based
technology and innovative communication methods while guarding free speech
on the internet. However, the internet industry is now on solid footing and
freedom of speech remains firmly intact. In the modern internet era, where
connection to the internet pervades the lives of anyone with a smartphone,
dangers have grown.182 Leaving internet self-regulation up to the discretion of
companies accountable to investors and profits is no longer a prudent course.
As a result of § 230, many victims of internet-related crime, abuse, and
harassment have been left without meaningful recourse in tort law. Congress
should therefore amend § 230 to include a notice-based takedown procedure as
outlined above, which would hold interactive computer services liable for failing
to comply with the procedure. Moreover, interactive computer services should
not be given broad immunity, but should be held to a reasonable standard of care
in negligence. In a society where individuals have no choice but to interact,
learn, and do business online, it makes no sense that tort law causes of action
should be practically impossible to sustain for those who are harmed online.
Congress must modernize this country’s internet policy to protect consumers in
cyberspace more robustly and deter antisocial and tortious activity more
vigorously.

181. Mann & Belzley, supra note 54, at 306.
182. Id.
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